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Sequential Traitor Tracing
Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, Member, IEEE, and Yejing Wang

Abstract—We consider a new type of traitor tracing scheme,
called sequential traitor tracing, that protects against rebroadcasting of decrypted content. Sequential traceability (TA) schemes
trace all up to traitors and remove the shortcomings of dynamic
tracing schemes. We give two general constructions and show the
relationship between -TA codes and sequential tracing schemes.
Index Terms—Error-correcting codes, fingerprinting, traitor
tracing.

I. INTRODUCTION

T

RAITOR tracing is studied in different contexts. In broadcast encryption [1], the information is broadcasted to a
set of authorized receivers. Each receiver has a decoder with a
unique key that allows him to decrypt the encrypted broadcast.
Traitor tracing schemes protect against a pirate decoder that is
constructed by a group of colluders that use their key information to illegally decrypt the broadcast. Traitor tracing is also used
in the context of data fingerprinting, where colluders use their
copies of a digital object to construct a pirate copy of the object;
again the aim is to trace one of the colluders.
Dynamic tracing [2], [3] considers the scenario where the
content is broadcasted to a group of authorized receivers. Here,
the colluders do not construct a pirate decoder but decrypt the
content and rebroadcast it. A simple solution to trace the source
of rebroadcast is to embed a different watermark for each receiver and trace the source of rebroadcast by examining the
embedded watermark in the rebroadcast. This solution, however, requires one copy of content for each user and so requires
very high bandwidth. Dynamic tracing [2] allows tracing all colluders with much lower bandwidth. The basic idea is to break
time into consecutive intervals and modify the watermarking
strategy of the system in each interval using the rebroadcasted
content. After observing the rebroadcast for long enough time,
one or more colluders can be traced. The identified colluders are
disconnected from the system and the system proceeds until all
colluders are found one by one and get disconnected. Dynamic
tracing has two main drawbacks. First, it is completely ineffective against an attack, called delayed rebroadcast, in which the
attackers rebroadcast the content with some delay. Under this attack not even a single colluder can be found. Second, it requires
high real-time computation and so is not suitable for systems
with a large number of users. Sequential tracing, first proposed
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in [4], removes these two shortcomings by tracing at least one
colluder if delayed rebroadcast attack is used and substantially
reducing the real-time computation cost. This paper is an extended and corrected version of that paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we recall dynamic tracing and point out its shortcomings. In Section III, we
introduce the model of sequential tracing, and in Sections IV
and V, describe two constructions, one based on function families and the other based on error-correcting codes. In Section VI,
we investigate the relationship between sequential -traceability
(TA) schemes and -TA codes. In Section VII, we provide a
bound on the size of collusion for codes that are obtained from
error-correcting codes. In Section VIII, we discuss our results
and propose possible extensions.
II. DYNAMIC TRACING
A

-ary watermarking system with mark set
consists of two algorithms: an embedding
algorithm that embeds one of the marks in a content, and
that takes a content and outputs one
a detection algorithm
of the marks, or “?.” To provide protection against removal
of the mark, the two algorithms may use the same secret key
information. We assume the watermarking system is robust
and the embedded mark cannot be changed or removed. An
example of such scheme is the spread-spectrum technique of
Cox et al. [5].
In dynamic tracing [2], [3], the content is divided into consecutive segments, for example, one minute interval in an audio
track. A watermarking algorithm is used to embed one of the
marks in the segment, hence creating versions of the segment.
In each interval, the user group is divided into subsets and
each subset receives one version of the segment. The subsets are
varied in each interval using the rebroadcasted content. It is assumed that there is an efficient group key management scheme
that allows the broadcaster to efficiently regroup the receivers
in each interval and securely deliver their allocated version. Fiat
and Tassa proved [2], [3] that for tracing traitors at least
versions must be used, and gave algorithms that use
and
versions and require
and
steps,
respectively, to find all colluders, that is to converge. Berkman
et al. [6], [7] improved these results and showed an algorithm
,
, versions and
steps
with
,
, versions
for convergence, and a second one with
steps for convergence. The main aim of these
and
works has been to construct schemes with the smallest number
of steps for convergence when the number of versions is close
.
to the lower bound
Dynamic tracing has two major shortcomings. The first shortcoming is that regrouping of the users and mark allocation to
users in each interval depends on the rebroadcasted content,
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also called feedback from the channel. This means that if there
is no feedback from the channel no regrouping will occur and
so the system is vulnerable to a delayed rebroadcast attack. In
this attack, the attackers do not immediately rebroadcast, but
record the content and rebroadcast it with some delay and so
the broadcaster has no alternative but keeping the mark allocation unchanged. With this attack the system fails completely and
cannot trace any colluder.
The second shortcoming of the system is high real-time
computation for regrouping the users and allocating marks to
subsets. This means that the length of a segment cannot be very
short. In dynamic tracing, the number of segments required
by the algorithm to converge grows with the number of users.
Hence, to trace colluders given a fixed length content, the length
of the segment must reduce as the size of the user population
grows. On the other hand, the computation for repartitioning
the group and allocating the versions grows with the size of the
group and because of the real-time nature of the computation,
the length of the segment cannot be decreased. The conflicting
requirements on the segment size, that is, requiring shorter
length to provide for longer convergence length, and at the
same time the need to have it longer to give time for real-time
computation, would result in unworkable systems for large
groups.

of
to allocate marks to users. A colluding group chooses
one of their versions and rebroadcasts it. The tracer intercepts
the rebroadcast, extracts the mark, and appends it to a sequence,
denote a colluding group,
called feedback sequence. Let
and

A feedback sequence
is called -feed,
, such that
back sequence if there exists a
for
. After observing a certain
number of segments from a feedback sequence, the tracer identifies one traitor (or more traitors) and disconnects him from
the system, that is, excludes him from future broadcasts. The
tracer continues observing the rebroadcast and identifying other
traitor(s) who will be disconnected in a similar way. After observing elements of the feedback sequence, all traitors are
found and the tracing algorithm converges, here is the convergence length of the algorithm. Let denote the subsequence
consisting of the first elements of .
Definition 1: A sequential -TA scheme consists of a mark
allocation table and a tracing algorithm with the following
properties:
is an
array with entries from ;
1)
is a mapping
2)

III. SEQUENTIAL TRACING
We consider the same scenario as dynamic tracing and
propose a different solution which removes the above shortcomings. In sequential tracing, the channel feedback is only
used for tracing and not for allocation of marks to users.
Similar to dynamic tracing, the system can trace all colluders.
The mark allocation table is predefined and there is no need
for real-time computation to determine the mark allocation of
the next interval. Other computations related to key management of the group can be all performed as precomputation
and so the need for real-time computation will be minimized.
Mark allocation in each interval will be according to the table
irrespective of the channel feedback. Using a predefined table
also protects against the delayed rebroadcast attack, however,
the tracing ability of the system will reduce to one traitor.
That is, even if the rebroadcast is delayed until the whole
content is received, still once colluders start rebroadcasting
at least one of them will be traced. We call the system sequential traitor tracing scheme to emphasise the fact that the
traitors are identified sequentially, that is, when a colluder is
found he is disconnected and the system proceeds to trace
the remaining colluders, and at the same time differentiate it
from dynamic schemes.
System Description
In sequential tracing, the protected content is divided into segments. A -ary watermarking system is used to produce verdenote the
sions of each segment. Let
be the mark set. A mark alset of users, and
location table is an array over with rows and columns
is the mark allocated to the user
in segment
where
. In the th time interval, the broadcaster uses the th column

such that for any -feedback sequence
sequence of integers

, there exists a

such that
,
(1)
otherwise
and
(2)
The colluders are identified in steps, where depends
because it is possible
on the feedback sequence and
to identify more than one colluder in one step. The working
, can be
of a sequential -TA scheme, denoted by
summarized as follows.
Set
While
For

and

Send version
to
If there is feedback
Extract
Append to
If
disconnect users in
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Disconnecting a user (or a group) means that they cannot
contribute to future rebroadcasts and the feedback sequence
will not have their contributions. Three parameters , , and
measure communication efficiency of the system. Parameter
is the number of versions of a segment and so higher means
more versions and higher bandwidth for sending the segment.
Parameter is the convergence length of the system and its
higher value means more segments are required to trace all
traitors. Parameter is the maximum number of traitors the
system tolerates.
Intuitively, there is a tradeoff between these two parameters.
That is, using more versions would allow shorter convergence
length. In Section VII, we give an expression that relates these
three parameters when the mark allocation table is derived from
an error-correcting code. In the following two sections, we describe two constructions of sequential TA schemes.

Define a mark allocation table

..
.

..
.

This construction identifies one of the colluders in
steps, and all colluders in at most
steps. That is, the
steps and the convergence length is
scheme converges in
independent of the size of the user group. However, the number
of versions is proportional to the group size and so for large
groups requires high bandwidth. We will show (Section VIII)
that the scheme can be recursively used to increase the number
of users while the number of versions is kept fixed. This will be
at the cost of higher convergence length.

..
.

..
.

(3)

That is, has block rows, each containing rows. Each row is
denotes the th row of the th block
allocated to a user and
, we say
row. For a feedback sequence
and have matches if there exist indexes
such that

and .
(4)

The tracing algorithm can be implemented by attaching a
counter to each row. The counter records the number of
is received from
matches between a row and . In step ,
in their
the channel. The row counters of rows that have
th position will be incremented. When a row counter reaches
, the corresponding user is identified as a traitor and is
disconnected from future broadcast. Let be the following
integer:

A. Mark Allocation Table
be the mark set, and
. Consider a collection of mappings

..
.

Let
denote the number of matches between
as follows:
Define a tracing function

IV. A CONSTRUCTION USING A FUNCTION FAMILY

Let
where

as follows:

(5)

be integers,

and the tracing
Theorem 1: The mark allocation table
function , as defined in (3) and (4), respectively, define a seusers. The convergence
quential -TA scheme for
and is given in (5).
length is
where

The proof of this theorem uses Lemmas 1 and 2 that follow.
Lemma 1: Let
(6)

satisfies the following two properties.
(P1) For a fixed , and a pair of the first indexes
, we have
for all
(P2) For a pair of the first indexes
with
of the second indexes
we have
,
.
for all
Let

and
matrices:

,

..
.

,
.

, and a pair
, if
,

, be the following

..
.

,
. Supbe a -feedback sequence produced by
. Then
.
pose
and
. Suppose
Proof: Assume
corresponds to the row
of . Consider the
positions
match. Since is constructed by and
that and
, there must be a colluder who has contributed two segments in
positions. Let the two segments be and ,
.
that
that matches in positions
,
That is, there is
in positions and . Because of the
and hence matches
structure of , we have one of the following two cases:
which gives
1)

or
2)

which gives
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The first case contradicts (P1). The second case contradicts (P2)
.
as

. This implies
hence (P2) is satisfied.

Corollary 1: i) Tracing one traitor requires
segments
from the traitor. ii) Tracing traitors in a single step requires at
segments from them.
most
Proof: Part i) is a direct corollary of Lemma 1. To prove
then is a traitor.
Part ii), we note that if
If in segment , traitors are simultaneously identified, it must
be the case that the users have simultaneously reached
matches with the -feedback sequence , and so each of the
users have matches with
. The number
is bounded
and so tracing traitors in a single step requires
by
segments.

The mark allocation table resulting from
rows and
have
and will be a sequential -TA scheme with

Consider a -feedback sequence . Let
such that
define

. For

, if

such that
(7)
be a -feedback seLemma 2: Let
be defined in (7). Then,
quence and
for
.
Proof: Let be the collusion produced and

For

, define

From (4) we have

. Applying Corollary 1 we obtain that

which proves the lemma.

For given
and

, and
in Theorem 2 will
columns,

and , must be chosen such that
and so

C. An Example
Example 1: To provide protection for 50 users against collu, we need in Theorem 2 to
sion of up to two colluders,
will have five block rows, each with 10 rows as shown
be .
at the top of the following page.
and
are the colluders, and assume
Suppose users
. We expect
the feedback sequence is
to identify the first colluder after observing at most
segments. That is after observing at most five segments, there
will be at least one row that will match the feedback sequence
positions while all other rows will have at most
in
matches. We note that length corresponds to the worst
(longest) case when both colluders have attempted to remain unknown for the longest period. However, it means that when the
first colluder is identified (three matches), the other one has already two matches with and will be caught after observing
the next segment. The following table lists columns that match
a particular segment in the feedback sequence. After observing
will
five segments of the feedback sequence, the colluder
have three matches and will be disconnected. The colluder
has appeared only twice which is the same number as some
. After observing the
of the innocent users, for example,
sixth element of the feedback sequence, this colluder will also
be identified.

Proof of Theorem 1: Consider
defined in
as
. If is given
(7). Using Lemma 2, we have
. That is,
. So
is a
by (5), then
sequential -TA scheme. The number of users is the number
and is equal to .
of rows of
B. Existence of
The construction in Section IV-A uses a function family
that satisfies properties (P1) and (P2). In the following, we give
a construction for .
Theorem 2: Let be a prime number,
Define a function family
follows:

Then, satisfies properties (P1) and (P2).
, then
Proof: If
and so (P1) is satisfied. Assume
and so if
we have

.
as

V. CONSTRUCTION FROM ERROR-CORRECTING CODES
Mark allocation tables can be obtained from error-correcting
codes by using each codeword as a row of the table.
-error-correcting code, or
Definition 2: An
-ECC for short, is a set of codewords of length
over an alphabet of size and having the minimum Hamming
distance between any pair of codewords equal to .

for all
. Then
we have

The mark allocation table in (3) corresponds to an error. A general construction from
correcting code with
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Mark Allocation Table for Example 1

an error-correcting code is given in Theorem 3. We need the
following lemmas.
Lemma 3: Let

be an

-ECC and

Consider a -feedback sequence
s.t.
define

(8)
,
. If
be a -feedback sequence produced by
, then
.
and
matches in
poProof: Let
such that and have at
sitions. Then, there exists a
matches within these positions, and so
least

This shows that
For an
as

. For

s. t.

, if

(10)

be a -feedback sebe defined as in (10). Then
for
.
Proof: Suppose is produced by . Let

Lemma 4: Let
quence and

For

.

. Let

, define

-ECC, define a tracing function
(9)

Corollary 2: The tracing function (9) for an
ECC has the following properties.
segments from
i) Tracing one traitor requires
a traitor.
traitors in a single step requires at most
ii) Tracing
segments from them.
Proof: Property i) is a direct corollary of Lemma 3. To
prove property ii), we note that if
then is a traitor. If in segment , traitors are simultaneously
identified it means that the users have reached
matches with the -feedback sequence
simultaneously, and
matches with
. The
so each of the users have
is bounded by
, so tracing traitors
number
segments.
in a single step requires

From (9), we have
obtain that

. Applying Corollary 2 we

which proves the lemma.
Theorem 3: Let be an integer, denote a mark allocation
-ECC satisfying
table obtained from an
(11)
and be defined as in (9). Then
scheme.
Proof: Consider
Lemma 4, we have

is a sequential -TA
defined in (10). Using
. The condition (11)

1324
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gives
scheme.

and so

is a sequential -TA

The code in Theorem 4 defines the mark allocation table of a
sequential -TA scheme for which

Theorem 3 shows that sequential tracing schemes can be constructed from -ary error-correcting codes with large minimum
distances and
VI. SEQUENTIAL -TRACEABILITY SCHEMES AND -TA CODES
Examples of codes that satisfy (11) are given in what follows.

Mark allocation table in a sequential TA scheme is closely
related to TA codes.
be a -ary code, and be an integer,
be a collusion of size
, where
. Define

Definition 3 [10]: Let

Reed–Solomon Codes
is a linear code
A Reed–Solomon code (RS-code) over GF
,
, and
codewords. An
with
RS-code defines a mark allocation table for a sequential -TA
scheme with

Then is called a -TA code if the following condition is satisfor some with
fied: for any
, there is a
such that

Algebraic-Geometry Codes
An algebraic-geometry code (AG-code) over GF , denoted
, is a linear code of length ,
by
where and are the dimension of the code
and the genus of the algebraic curve, respectively. It is known
exist,
[8] that AG-codes with parameters
having
if there exists an algebraic curve of genus over GF
rational points. For
, the curves of genus are elliptic
and any
curves which are known to exist for any
where
and
is defined as
is odd
else.
, the curve of genus exists for any
and
When
, where
and
is given as follows.
any
If

.

for any

.

Staddon et al. [10] proved the following theorem.
Theorem 5: Let
teger. If

be an

-ECC, and

be an in-

(12)
then

is a -TA code.

For an
ECC obtained from
components.

-ECC, let
denote the
by restricting each codeword to its first

Theorem 6: Let be sequential -TA scheme obtained from
-ECC with satisfying (11). Then, there exists
an
such that
a sequence of integers
,
, is a
-TA code.
. That is,
Proof: Let

If
nonspecial
The minimum Hamming distance

of

satisfies

From Theorem 5,

-TA code.

special,
special,
Here is special means that either
or is of the forms:
,
, or
for some integer .
An AG-code defines the mark allocation table of a sequential
-TA scheme for which

is a

Corollary 3: Mark allocation table of a sequential -TA
scheme is a -TA code.
VII. ASYMPTOTIC BOUNDS

Low-Rate Codes
, let
Theorem 4 ([9, Lemma III.3]): For positive integers
. Then there exists an
-ECC where
.

Intuitively, we expect a tradeoff among , , and . That is, we
expect higher bandwidth results in a shorter convergence length.
In the following, we give a relation between these parameters for
mark allocation tables that are based on error-correcting codes.
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-ECC,

The following Theorem shows a bound on for a sequential
-TA scheme obtained from an
-ECC with
satisfying (11). This bound was stated in [12] for a -TA obtained
-ECC with satisfying (12). Here, we give
from an
an alternative proof.
Theorem 8: Let be an integer,
with satisfying (11) and

be an
. Then

-ECC

for sufficiently large .
Proof: Assume otherwise, that is,

This implies that

If

, or equivalently

satisfies (11), then

Applying Theorem 7, we have

and so

Let

be a -ary
code and
be an
-ary
code. Define the composition of the two codes to be
a -ary code obtained by i) associating each codeword of
with a symbol in the alphabet set of
and ii) in each codeword
of , replacing symbols by their associated codewords of .
with
The code will be a -ary code of length
codewords. We refer to
and
as the inner and the outer
code, respectively.
and
be a -ary
code and
Theorem 9: Let
-ary
code, respectively, and let denote the
an
composition of the inner code and the outer code . Suppose
is a -TA code and is a sequential -TA scheme. Then is
sequential -TA scheme over a -ary alphabet.
an
Proof: Let be the mark allocation table of a sequential
-TA scheme and assume there is a group of colluders. We
construct a sequential tracing algorithm for .
The algorithm starts by initializing the feedback sequence
. The rebroadcasted content is considered in blocks of
segments. Each block represents a pirate word in . Using
the tracing algorithm of , the block is traced to one of the colalphabet associated with the
luders and hence a symbol in
colluder. This symbol is appended to to form the feedback
is employed
sequence of . Now the tracing algorithm of
to trace colluders.
The correctness of the tracing algorithm follows from the corand .
rectness of the tracing algorithms of
Theorem 6 showed that a sequential TA code is a -TA code.
This means that the code obtained above can be used as a -TA
code and be composed with a sequential -TA scheme again. By
repeating the composition times, one can construct a -ary
sequential -TA scheme where
.
A. Delayed Rebroadcast

Note that

For sufficiently large

gives a contradiction as

is an integer.

VIII. DISCUSSION
As noted earlier, for a fixed-size group there is a tradeoff between the alphabet size and the convergence length. That is, for
shorter convergence length larger alphabet size is required. In
the following, we show a method of composing TA codes that
results in systems for larger group sizes while keeping the alphabet size constant but increasing the convergence length.
code over a -ary alphabet
is a subset of
An
of size . With this definition, a -TA code and a mark allocation table of a sequential -TA scheme are codes over -ary
alphabets.

Sequential tracing alleviates delayed rebroadcast attack.
The mark allocation of each interval is determined solely by a
column of the mark allocation table and does not depend on the
feedback from the channel. The broadcaster follows the mark
allocation table even if there is no rebroadcast. In the worst
case, the colluders wait for the broadcast to be completed and
then start the rebroadcast. This is the same as the traditional
TA systems and since a sequential tracing scheme is a -TA
code then at least one of the colluders can be found. In fact,
segments of the content can be used to identify
the first
a colluder. However, tracing more than one colluder requires
the contribution of the traced one to be removed from the
remaining content which is not possible in this case and so the
system guarantees one colluder to be found. This is in contrast
to the dynamic scheme that will become completely insecure
against this attack.
B. Time–Bandwidth Tradeoff
Two important efficiency parameters of dynamic traitor
tracing schemes are i) the number of marks which determines
the communication efficiency of the system, and ii) the convergence length . Fiat and Tassa, and later Berkman et al. [6]
concentrated on the communication efficiency and presented
efficient algorithms when is close to its theoretical minimum
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. Berkman et al. showed that if
,
, it
steps. Schemes
is possible to find traitors in
constructed in Section V (for example, the one obtained from
versions and require
steps
Theorem 4) use
.
to converge, where
In Theorem 9 we showed a way of trading convergence length
with alphabet size. It is worth noting that the actual convergence
time is the product of the length of a segment and the convergence length. As noted earlier, sequential tracing reduces the
real-time computation and so can use shorter segments. However, the actual convergence time in these schemes might be
lower in practice.
C. Conclusions
Sequential TA schemes fit between static and dynamic TA
schemes. The application scenario in sequential schemes and
dynamic schemes are the same and is different from static -TA
schemes. Also, the goal of the former two is the same (tracing
all traitors) and is different from -TA schemes in which the
aim is to identify one colluder. Sequential schemes do not use
the feedback from the channel to allocate marks and so in general would require higher bandwidth and a higher number of
segments to converge. However, they provide security against
delayed rebroadcast attack and reduce the real-time computation. The main construction of sequential TA schemes is by
using error-correcting codes with large minimum distance. We
showed that the mark allocation table in a sequential TA scheme
gives a sequence of -TA schemes. Determining necessary and
sufficient conditions for -TA schemes to be used as sequential
-TA schemes is an interesting open problem.
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